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DONAHUE’S FILS AÎNÉ: REFLECTIONS ON
WILKES AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS
OF SELFISH OWNERSHIP
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER*
INTRODUCTION
Judging from frequency of citations, Wilkes v. Springside Nurs
ing Home, Inc. 1 is at best the “oldest son” of the “great man” that is
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.2 A recent Westlaw search shows
that the latter has been cited more than twice as many times as the
former,3 and Donahue’s pronouncement “that stockholders in the
close corporation owe one another . . . the utmost good faith and
loyalty”4 seems the modern analog to Cardozo’s “punctilio of an
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; A.B., Harvard University;
J.D., Yale Law School.
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
2. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). The phrase
“fils aı̂né” means literally “oldest son” but in earlier times also connoted the offspring
expected to carry on the traditions of the family. E-mail from F. R. P. (Ron) Akehurst,
Emeritus Professor of French, University of Minnesota, to Daniel Kleinberger, Profes
sor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:31 PM CST) (on file with
the author). According to Professor Akehurst:
In the customary law areas (northern France) and until the fourteenth century
the southern half of the country, the eldest son had preferential treatment. In
many places he got two thirds of his father’s (real) estate, while the other
siblings shared the rest between them. He also got the title, if there was one,
and the principal fortified place or castle, itf [sic] there was one or more.
Id.; see also PHILIPPE DE REMI BEAUMANOIR, THE Coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe
de Beaumanoir 465 (F. R. P. Akehurst trans., 1992).
3. As of February 4, 2011, Donahue had been cited 1,554 times. KEYCITE CITING
REFERENCES: Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search
for Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 and following the “Citing Refer
ences” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). However, as of February 4, 2011, Wilkes had
only been cited 779 times. KEYCITE CITING REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 and following the “Citing References” link) (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
4. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (footnote omitted) (quoting DeCotis v. D’Antona,
214 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Mass. 1966); Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
405
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honor the most sensitive.”5
Wilkes, in contrast, does not appear seminal. Courts outside
Massachusetts cite it only occasionally, and often in support of the
Donahue rule of “utmost good faith.”6 Casebooks treat Donahue
more often than Wilkes,7 and one of the articles in this symposium
is entitled The Vacuity of Wilkes.8
This Article, in contrast, asserts that Wilkes should be at least
as memorable as Donahue, and is, in a practical sense, substantially
more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that
Donahue, like Meinhard v. Salmon,9 announces admirable senti
ments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes
provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression”10
5. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Indeed, Donahue sees its
approach as an extrapolation of Cardozo’s ruling. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
6. E.g., Moore v. Maine Indus. Servs., Inc., 645 A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 1994);
Tomaino v. Concord Oil of Newport, Inc., 709 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 1998); Solomon v.
Atlantis Dev., Inc., 516 A.2d 132, 136 (Vt. 1986).
7. E.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 338-43 (1st ed. 2003) (excerpting
Donahue; never citing or discussing Wilkes); ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE
ORGANIZATION 803-13 (3rd ed. 1981) (excerpting Donahue; never discussing Wilkes,
citing Wilkes only as a “Reference[ ] on Oppression in Close Corporations,” a list found
after excerpted cases in the section); J.S. COVINGTON, JR., BASIC LAW OF CORPORA
TIONS 369-78 (1989) (excerpting Donahue; never citing or discussing Wilkes); DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 586-97 (2002) (excerpting Donahue; never dis
cussing Wilkes, only citing Wilkes for an unrelated proposition in a different chapter);
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
298-310 (2005) (excerpting Donahue; never discussing Wilkes, only citing Wilkes in ref
erence to a single question posed in a “Notes & Questions” section); LARRY E. RIB
STEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 276-85 (2d ed. 1990) (excerpting Donahue; never citing
or discussing Wilkes); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIA
TIONS 203-11 (4th ed. 2003) (excerpting Donahue; very briefly mentioning Wilkes in the
“Notes & Questions” section); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCOR
PORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 313 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing Donahue; never citing or
discussing Wilkes). When Wilkes does appear as a principal case, it is almost always a
tag along with Donahue. E.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES:
LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 311-22 (2009) (excerpting both Don
ahue and Wilkes; but beginning with Donahue, including a much shorter excerpt of
Wilkes, and extensively discussing Donahue, nearly to the exclusion of Wilkes, in the
“Notes” section following the cases); THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 305-16 (2d ed. 2006) (excerpting
Donahue; only briefly discussing Wilkes in the “Notes” section following the excerpt of
Donahue).
8. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433 (2011).
9. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546-47.
10. This Article uses “oppression” to represent all the various labels jurisdictions
use to denominate shareholder versus shareholder claims within close corporations, in
cluding “unfairly prejudicial,” “loyalty,” and “reasonable expectations.” See, e.g., McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (referring
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claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other
reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white.11 In particu
lar, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule
is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating both a vic
tim’s claim of majoritarian wrongdoing and the majority’s claim of
legitimate motive and even business necessity.
Because this symposium is for Wilkes rather than Donahue,
description and praise of Wilkes occupies most of this Article. We
begin, however, by putting Donahue in its place. Part I describes
the role of Donahue—then (i.e. when decided) and now. Part II
describes the “schizoid fiduciary duties”12 among owners within
closely held businesses, states the Wilkes test, and explains that
test’s genius for dealing with complex disputes among co-owners.
Part III further delineates and explains the Wilkes test. Part IV
notes that, structurally and conceptually, Wilkes succeeded in put
ting new wine in old bottles, giving the Wilkes rule a familiar feel
despite its novel approach. Part V uses two cases in which “op
pressed” shareholders were also miscreants and shows how applica
tion of the Wilkes rule would have produced a more nuanced
analysis and a better result. This Article concludes with some
thoughts on the influence of Wilkes in Massachusetts and
elsewhere.
I. DONAHUE, THEN

AND

NOW

Donahue was indubitably important when decided. In 1975, it
was far from a foregone conclusion that close corporations should
be analogized to partnerships for the purposes of recognizing
owner-to-owner fiduciary duties.13 Today, however, except in aber
to “[o]ppressive conduct” as “an expansive term that is used to cover a multitude of
situations dealing with improper conduct”); Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014,
1018 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (discussing the “[t]wo definitions [of oppression which] have
gained currency in New York and in the numerous reported decisions across the
country”).
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra notes 28 and 39 and accompanying text.
13. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
BUS. LAW. 699, 704 (1993) (stating that “[i]n recent years, legislatures and courts have
recognized the different characteristics of the close corporation and have modified the
statutory and fiduciary norm” (emphasis added)); Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppres
sion & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation His
tory, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 894 (2005) (referring to “the seminal decision of
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.”). It can argued that the label “seminal” more prop
erly belongs to a different case, Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975), a case
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rant jurisdictions such as Delaware14 and Louisiana,15 the notion of
an “incorporated partnership”16 is a given, and the cases applying
shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties are easily as important
as cases detailing the partner-to-partner duties within general
partnerships.17
cited by Wilkes. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1970). Schwartz contains the following pivotal passage:
Departure from precisely uniform treatment of stockholders may be justified,
of course, where a bona fide business purpose indicates that the best interests
of the corporation would be served by such departure. The burden of coming
forward with proof of such justification shifts to the directors where, as here, a
prima facie case of unequal stockholder treatment is made out. Particularly is
this so when it appears that members of the board of directors favored them
selves individually over the complaining shareholder. Additionally, distur
bance of equality of stock ownership in a corporation closely held for several
years by the members of two families calls for special justification in the cor
porate interest; not only must it be shown that it was sought to achieve a bona
fide independent business objective, but as well that such objective could not
have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other means which
would not have disturbed proportionate stock ownership.
Id. Note, however, that the Donahue rule applies more broadly than the Schwartz rule.
Moreover, Donahue has been cited approximately six times more often than Schwartz.
See supra note 3 and KEYCITE CITING REFERENCES: Schwartz v. Marien, WESTLAW,
www.westlaw.com (search for Schwartz v. Marien, 37 N.Y.2d 487 and following the
“Citing References” link) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011) (listing 248 documents).
14. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 & n.2 (Del. 1996) (rejecting
special shareholder-to-shareholder duties under Delaware law, where the corporation
had not elected to be governed by the close corporation statute).
15. Dunbar v. Williams, 554 So. 2d 56, 69 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Wilkes to
“note that some states protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations from
termination without cause” but deciding that Louisiana law gives no such protection).
16. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass.
1975).
17. See generally Thompson, supra note 13. The pioneer in this area of law was F.
Hodge O’Neal. See e.g. F. Hodge O’Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Pro
tecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (1987) (“Unfair treatment of holders
of minority interests in family companies and other closely held corporations by per
sons in control of those corporations is so widespread that it is a national business scan
dal.”). Indeed, it is possible to argue that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
(RUPA) overlooks partner-to-partner duties. See generally REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT
(1997) [hereinafter RUPA]. RUPA § 404 purports to exhaustively codify all fiduciary
duties owed by partners and thereby “cabin in” the danger that courts might use fiduci
ary duty to undercut partnership agreements. See id. § 404. However, the specified
duties each serve to protect the entity, rather than the partners. Id. “The ‘cabin in’
approach ignores the implicit fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of members to avoid op
pressing fellow members, produces great difficulty in dealing with member-to-member
disclosure obligations in member-to-member buy-sell transactions, and puts inordinate
pressure on the concept of ‘good faith and fair dealing.’” Daniel S. Kleinberger &
Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Com
pany Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 515, 522-23 (2007) (footnotes omitted) (explaining why the
drafters of Re-ULLCA decided to un-cabin fiduciary duties).

R

R
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Granted, Donahue did more than make the partnership anal
ogy. As noted above, the case made “utmost good faith” promi
nent in the close corporation lexicon.18 But that label is so vague as
to be almost meaningless, except in circumstances in which the ma
jority has committed the close corporation equivalent of a “back
alley mugging.”19 “[R]ecognizing the fiduciary nature of a relation
ship does not give it content in any given context.”20
At first glance, the following pronouncement from Donahue
might seem to provide guidance: “Stockholders in close corpora
tions must discharge their management and stockholder respon
sibilities in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They
may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in deroga
tion of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the
corporation.”21 Careful reading, however, reveals ambiguity: i.e.,
is self-interest per se in derogation of the duty of loyalty, or is
self-interest wrongful only to the extent that it derogates the loy
alty duty? Donahue provides no answer.22
18. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19. Fine phrasing and practical guidance often fail to align. For example, Charles
E. Clark praised the judicial careers and personal attributes of two cousins, Learned
and Augustus Hand, who both served on the Second Circuit, noting that “Learned
Hand’s brilliant and volatile nature, coupled with his unusual stylistic gifts, has served
to render him better known to the general public than his cousin.” Charles E. Clark,
Augustus Noble Hand, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1957). Clark, however, quoted
“Justice Jackson’s classic barb uttered in an evening of general acclaim: ‘In short, just a
word of advice to you district judges here present: Always quote Learned and follow
Gus.’” Id. Out of filial respect, I note that I first learned this aphorism from my father,
a member of the New York bar.
20. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
21. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
22. The same criticism applies to Cardozo’s beautiful phrasings:
Cardozo’s words are quite vague. It is one thing to say in general, “be your
brother’s keeper,” but how does the principle apply when, for instance, your
brother wants to watch the opera, you want to watch the football game, and
your house has only one TV and no TiVo, DVR, or VCR? What does “the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” mean when the two partners in an atwill partnership are discussing a change in profit shares because one partner
believes she is bringing in most of the business?
DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLA
NATIONS § 9.8.1, at 285-86 (3d ed. 2008) (footnote omitted) (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). A controversial provision in the Revised Uni
form Partnership Act recognizes this problem. RUPA provides: “A partner does not
violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely
because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.” RUPA § 404(e).
The Official Comment explains:
Subsection (e) is new and deals expressly with a very basic issue on which
the UPA is silent. A partner as such is not a trustee and is not held to the
same standards as a trustee. Subsection (e) makes clear that a partner’s con

R
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Donahue does contain one practical, operational holding—the
so-called “equal opportunity” rule:
When [a] corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corpo
ration, the purchase is subject to the . . . requirement, in the light
of our holding in this opinion, that the stockholders, who, as di
rectors or controlling stockholders, caused the corporation to
enter into the stock purchase agreement, must have acted with
the utmost good faith and loyalty to the other stockholders.
To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares were pur
chased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling
stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stock
holder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares
to the corporation at an identical price.23

For a while, this rule generated interesting jurisprudential ripples–both as to the per se rule itself24 and to the definition of “the
controlling group.”25 Today, however, the per se rule has few (if
duct is not deemed to be improper merely because it serves the partner’s own
individual interest.
That admonition has particular application to the duty of loyalty and the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing. It underscores the partner’s rights as
an owner and principal in the enterprise, which must always be balanced
against his duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example, a
partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may, under subsection (e),
legitimately vote against a proposal by the partnership to open a competing
shopping center.
RUPA § 404 cmt. 5. The provision was replicated in the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act § 305(c) (2001), but omitted from the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act. “This language is inappropriate in the complex and variegated world of LLCs. As
a proposition of contract law, the language is axiomatic and therefore unnecessary. In
the context of fiduciary duty, the language is at best incomplete, at worst wrong, and in
any event confusing.” REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409 cmt. to subsection e
(1996).
23. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518 (footnote omitted).
24. E.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 652-53 (Md. 1985) (re
jecting a per se equal opportunity rule; finding no harm where the plaintiff did not lose
any voting power because she was and remained a minority shareholder); Sundberg v.
Lampert Lumber Co., 390 N.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to con
sider equal opportunity rule; interpreting relevant statute to limit buyout remedy to
corporations with thirty-five or fewer shareholders), superseded by statute, Minn. Stat.
§ 302A.751 (1994), as recognized in Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (adopting the equal opportunity rule because the duty of the
“controlling shareholder group . . . [was] substantially akin to that fiduciary duty owed
by one partner to another, to deal inter sese in the utmost good faith”).
25. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19; see e.g., Schroer, 482 N.E.2d at 977 n.1
(describing the complex capital structure that created a family control group); Demou
las v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., No. 90-2927(B), 1995 WL 476772, at *81 (Mass.
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any) adherents (not even Massachusetts),26 and the most interesting
questions as to control with close corporations pertain to power ex
ercised by minority shareholders, or more pointedly, issue-specific
control.27
In sum, today Donahue is most interesting as a matter of his
tory and fine language. As a practical guide to conduct, it has little
relevance.
II. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE

OF

WILKES

Wilkes, in contrast, has significant continuing relevance. To ap
preciate that relevance requires an understanding of what I have
elsewhere termed “schizoid fiduciary duty.”28 In a classic fiduciary
relationship, the fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to the party pro
tected by the fiduciary’s duty.29 Strict rules prohibit competition,
Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1995) (finding a control group comprised of “closely-knit” individuals
who had common interests and acted in concert to manage the companies).
26. See Powell v. MVE Holdings, Inc., 626 N.W.2d 451, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting “that the Massachusetts Supreme Court later retreated from the Donahue hold
ing in [Wilkes] because legitimate business reasons may exist for treating different
shareholders differently” (citation omitted)). Even with the Donahue facts, a Massa
chusetts court would allow the majority shareholders to assert a legitimate business
purpose, thereby circumventing a categorical breach of duty. See Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); see also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
27. E.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (consid
ering a minority shareholder’s threat to sell his stock to someone ineligible to own stock
in a S corporation and stating “because [the would-be seller’s] actions will determine
whether the Company retains its advantageous S status, he unquestionably has control
over that issue”); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853-54 (Mass. 1988) (holding
that control can exist within a minority block); Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d
798, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“The 80% [supermajority approval] provision [applica
ble to declaring dividends] may have substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles
of the majority and the minority shareholders. The minority, under that provision, be
comes an ad hoc controlling interest.”).
28. Kleinberger & Bishop, supra note 17, at 526; see also KLEINBERGER, supra
note 22, § 9.8.5, at 293 (noting that in “Partner-to-partner transactions (when partners
engage each other in partnership-related financial transactions) . . . [and in a] Partners’
exercise of discretion vis-à-vis copartners . . . one partner’s interests will inevitably be
adverse to another’s”).
29. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[I]t is elemental
that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests
the fiduciary is to protect. This is a sensitive and ‘inflexible’ rule of fidelity, barring not
only blatant self-dealing, but also requiring avoidance of situations in which a fiduci
ary’s personal interest possibly conflicts with the interest of those owed a fiduciary
duty.” (citations omitted)); Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 574, 581
n.2 (Wash. 2001) (“The duty of a fiduciary to his beneficiary is essentially that of a
trustee. A fiduciary ‘is bound to act in the highest good faith toward his beneficiary’ and
he may never seek to gain an advantage over his beneficiary by any means. A fiduciary

R

R
R
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usurpation of opportunity, and self-dealing, and self-interest is per
missible only with informed consent.30
Within a closely held business, however, the situation is
different. When an owner functions as an entity manager, standard
duties do apply.31 But when oppression is alleged, the construct
changes; in that context, the co-owners are not classic fiduciaries.32
For one thing, each co-owner is simultaneously both a fiduciary ob
ligee and a fiduciary obligor.33 For another, each co-owner has
some right to pursue self interest.34 For example, when a compen
sation committee decides bonuses for all the firms’ owners, the situ
ation certainly requires more exacting standards than “morals of
must give priority to his beneficiary’s best interest whenever he acts on the beneficiary’s
behalf. A fiduciary owes his beneficiary a duty of undivided loyalty, meaning that a
fiduciary cannot abandon or stray from this relationship to further his own interests.”
(quoting Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their In
sureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1, 2 (2000))).
30. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. 1939) (discussing unautho
rized acts of a corporate officer and doctrines relating to “self-interest,” corporate op
portunity, and anti-competition); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02-.04
(2006); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.02, 5.04-.06
(1994).
31. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30 and 8.31 (2008) (stating conduct and liability
standards for all directors and making no reference to any exclusion or different rule for
directors of close corporations); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. 1 (stating
that “Section 8.30(a) establishes the basic standards of conduct for all directors” and
that “[i]ts command is to be understood as peremptory—its obligations are to be ob
served by every director” (emphasis added)); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good
Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in Closely Held Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1143 , 1145 (1990). The situation is more complicated when controlling shareholders
damage or despoil the company in order to expropriate the value due to a minority
shareholder. Those situations are beyond the scope of this Article, and essentially raise
questions of the distinction between direct and derivative lawsuits. See Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Direct Versus Derivative and the Law of Limited Liability Companies, 58
BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 121-25 (2006); Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct
vs. Derivative, or “What’s a Lawsuit Between Friends in an ‘Incorporated Partner
ship?’”, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1270-71 (1996).
32. See Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 365-66 (Mont.
1990) (distinguishing cases relied on by the trial court because, although those cases
concerned fiduciary duty (agency law and an executor’s trusteeship over the assets of
the decedent’s estate), they did not involve “the unique relationship between share
holders of a close corporation”).
33. This situation is comparable to the situation of mutual agency among general
partners in a non-LLP general partnership. Each partner is simultaneously an agent of
the other partners and one of the principals comprising the partnership. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958) (stating that, in “usual” circumstances, “a
partner is a general agent for the other members of the group”).
34. RUPA § 404 cmt. 1 (1997) (“Arguably, the term ‘fiduciary’ is inappropriate
when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may legitimately pursue
self-interest . . . .”).
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the market place.”35 But just as certainly, classic fiduciary rules do
not make sense. Likewise, what does selflessness mean when a
majority of owners exercise a “guillotine” expulsion provision, per
mitting them to oust a fellow owner without cause and without even
an opportunity for a hearing?36 Or what does it mean when con
trolling shareholders determine what to do with a shareholder
employee who is engaging in sexual harassment?37 “[E]ven if
[co-owners] are never fully at arm’s length, they are nonetheless
occasionally on opposite sides of the negotiating table. In such cir
cumstances, self interest is inherent and inevitable.”38
To use the term “schizoid” to describe the resulting obligations
may seem pejorative. One dictionary defines the word as “an of
fensive term describing a personality that suggests inner conflicts
and exhibits outer contradictions.”39 But pejorative or not, the def
inition is apt in the context of owner-to-owner duties. Without a
proper lens, the relationship and the duties appear in conflict and in
contradiction. For example, what does “utmost good faith” mean
when an employer-shareholder is terminated for, among other
things, assaulting a fellow shareholder and doing criminal damage
to a customer’s property?40 What does “utmost good faith” require
when an employer-shareholder is terminated for misusing company
funds and intimidating both customers and employees?41
For such situations Wilkes makes two substantial contributions.
The first is conceptual. Wilkes expressly recognizes the schizoid
reality:
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict
good faith standard enunciated in Donahue . . . will result in the
imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling
group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its effec
35. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
36. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL
22768666, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003); P.F. Jurgs & Co. v. O’Brien, 629 A.2d
325, 327 (Vt. 1993); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
37. See Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 517-18 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000).
38. KLEINBERGER, supra note 22, § 9.8.5, at 292.
39. Schizoid Definition, MSN ENCARTA DICTIONARY, http://encarta.msn.com/
encnet/features/dictionary/dictionaryresults.aspx?lextype=3&search=schizoid (last vis
ited Jan. 9, 2011).
40. See infra notes 113-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pooley v.
Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. App. 1994).
41. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of Edenbaum
v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).

R

R
R
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tiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all
concerned. The majority, concededly, have certain rights to what
has been termed “selfish ownership” in the corporation which
should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obliga
tion to the minority.42

The second contribution is practical. Wilkes provides an oper
ational rule for determining whether a particular act or course of
conduct breaches the majority’s “fiduciary obligation to the minor
ity” or instead reflects the legitimate rights of selfish ownership.43
[W]hen minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty
owed to them by the majority, . . . [i]t must be asked whether the
controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose
for its action.
When an asserted business purpose for their action is ad
vanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to minority
stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective
could have been achieved through an alternative course of action
less harmful to the minority’s interest. If called on to settle a
dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if
any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.44

III.

DETAILING

AND

UNDERSTANDING

THE

WILKES TEST

The “Wilkes test” has four steps, although the first is actually
assumed in the Wilkes opinion (and therefore I label it step zero).
Step zero begins with the complaining minority shareholder making
a plausible claim that the majority’s conduct has affected an argua
bly protected right of the complainant.45 Without such a showing,
the defendants should not be required to justify their conduct. Any
other approach would encourage nuisance suits, which would itself
ignore “the fact that the controlling group in a close corporation
must have some room to maneuver in establishing the business pol
icy of the corporation.”46 The cases do not linger on this point.
42. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
43. Id.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id. (noting that “when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit
against the majority alleging a breach of . . . duty . . . [the court] must carefully analyze
the action taken by the controlling stockholders . . . ask[ing] whether the controlling
group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose”—thereby, implying Step Zero of
this analysis).
46. Id.
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When loss of employment is at issue, the showing is made almost
automatically.47 For less dramatic employment-related claims, use
ful authority is available from the sometimes analogous realm of
discrimination law. “An adverse employment action is not a trivial
offense or petty slight.”48 For example, a claim that one’s office has
been relocated or repainted49 should not trigger the next step of the
Wilkes analysis.
Assuming the plaintiff surmounts step zero, step one provides
that the majority is obliged to demonstrate a legitimate business
purpose.50 In many cases, the analysis stops here.51 In a classic sit
uation of aggression and expropriation, the defendants cannot meet
their burden of proof. Thus, in the close corporation version of a
“back alley mugging,” the multi-step Wilkes test is unnecessary, but
its application is benign and speedy.
If the defendants surmount step one, step two requires the
complainant to prove a less harmful alternative for addressing the
demonstrated legitimate business purpose.52 This step is the genius
of the Wilkes test, recognizing that neither the apparent infringe
ment of complainant’s rights nor the legitimate rationale of those
running the business should be automatically dispositive.53 If each
side is in part right and in part wrong, then an all-or-nothing rule
will routinely produce bad results. This step allows the court a lim
ited role in second-guessing the business judgment of the majority
and therefore conduces majorities toward special care in dealing
with the interests of minority shareholders. This step also imposes
47. The majority of oppression claims involve loss of employment. See Kathleen
L. Kuhlman, Beyond Crosby v. Beam: Ohio Courts Extend Protection of Minority
Stockholders of Close Corporations, 27 AKRON L. REV. 477, 479 (1994); Peter A. Mah
ler, Twenty Years of Court Decisions Have Clarified Shareholder Rights Under BCL
§§ 1104-a and 1118, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 31 (1999).
48. Quinn v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 09-1372 ADM/LIB, 2010 WL 3733970, at *5 (D.
Minn. Sept. 20, 2010) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
68 (2006)).
49. Id. at *1. The Wilkes analysis is also powerful in cases involving non-em
ployee shareholders, but such cases are beyond the scope of this Article.
50. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
51. See, e.g., id. Exactly this result occurred in Wilkes. “Applying this approach
to the instant case it is apparent that the majority stockholders in Springside have not
shown a legitimate business purpose for severing Wilkes from the payroll of the corpo
ration or for refusing to reëlect [sic] him as a salaried officer and director.” Id.; see also
A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997); Glydon v. Conway,
No. 01-P-1414, 2003 WL 21665004, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. July 16, 2003); Beers v. Tisdale, 603 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
52. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
53. Id.
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on the complainant the task of explaining how—accepting the ma
jority’s legitimate purpose—the majority used needlessly harmful
means, thereby requiring the complainant to consider the practical
problems caused by the complainant’s own conduct. This proposi
tion follows inecluctably from the structure of the Wilkes approach.
If the majority’s legitimate purpose involves responding to the com
plainant’s misconduct, the complainant will have to demonstrate a
better way of dealing with that misconduct.
Most cases that reach this stage end here with a decision for
the defendants.54 In addition, step two provides guidance to law
yers seeking a compromise resolution—i.e., a structure for
discourse.55
If the analysis reaches step three, the court balances the com
peting claims of the parties, “weigh[ing] the legitimate business pur
pose . . . against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.”56
Few, if any cases, reach this stage.57 The balancing would presuma
bly involve: (i) the importance of the business purpose; (ii) the
54. E.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 20-22 (1st Cir.
2002) (holding that a legitimate business purpose existed where the shareholders had
justifiable reasons to vote against a merger); Holland v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A,
2008 WL 4514664, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 18, 2008) (finding a legitimate business
purpose of “preserv[ing] and continu[ing] the successful operation of the” company);
Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353-54 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (hold
ing that termination of employment due to poor performance was a legitimate business
purpose). But see Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818 n.23 (Mass. 2009) (“We
take the judge’s conclusion that the allegations against Pointer were not grounds for his
termination to mean that the defendants have not established a legitimate business pur
pose for the termination. . . . In the one area where the judge found that Pointer en
gaged in any misconduct, his political contributions, we agree with the judge that
termination was not necessary; a simple discussion would have been enough. In any
event, Pointer reimbursed FGC.”).
55. See Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 802-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(referring to “[t]he . . . pertinent guidance . . . found in the Wilkes case, essentially to
the effect that in any judicial intervention in such a situation there must be a weighing
of the business interests advanced as reasons for their action (a) by the majority or
controlling group and (b) by the rival persons or group” and stating that “[i]t would
obviously be appropriate, before a court-ordered solution is sought or imposed, for
both sides to attempt to reach a sensible solution of any incipient impasse in the interest
of all concerned after consideration of all relevant circumstances” (internal citations
omitted)).
56. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
57. See Alder Food Distribs., Inc. v. Keating, No. 0000748, 2000 WL 33170823, at
*5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 6, 2000) (contemplating alternative remedial actions; hold
ing that there were less harmful alternatives to an indefinite suspension without pay in
response to a minority shareholder’s improper management techniques; recognizing
that the majority shareholder had reasonable grounds to impose punishment, but the
chosen disciplinary actions were “far too harmful a means of achieving a legitimate
business objective”).
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question of acceptable “margin of error” risk in devising a method
to serve that purpose;58 and (iii) any demerits in the proffered alter
native—especially issues as to practicality and concerns as to
whether the alternative would serve the business purpose equally as
well as the majority’s chosen course of action.
IV. APPRECIATING

THE

WILKES TEST

AS A

LEGAL CONSTRUCT

As will be seen below, the Wilkes test can work remarkably
well in resolving schizoid issues.59 But Wilkes is also remarkable
from a purely conceptual perspective. Although the Wilkes test
was novel when announced, its structure and components were not.
The Wilkes rule takes its structure from McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green,60 a famous case in an adjacent area of law. The rule’s
content is a variation on the business judgment rule, a major theme
of corporate law.61 These borrowings are sub silentio but nonethe
less apparent.
Legal authorities differ on the virtues of putting new wine in
old bottles,62 but Wilkes did well to do so. Appropriate borrowing
58. For example, a purpose might be both very important and very fragile—i.e.,
with little margin for error in effectuating the purpose. In that case, the balance would
tilt against the plaintiff.
59. See infra Part V.
60. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 792 (1973).
61. See Bender v. Swartz, 917 A.2d 142, 152-53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007); Uni
trin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1372-73 (Del. 1995).
62. See, e.g., Cumberland Corp. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 383 F. Supp.
595, 599 n.1 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (“The repeated difficulties encountered with limitations
issues in products liability cases in Tennessee is illustrative of the need for careful and
thorough legislative revision in this area of the law. . . . Instead of making a re-evalua
tion of the interests of the plaintiff, of the defendant and of the public, and developing a
rational system of limitations in the light of the developing law of products liability,
there has been a seesaw judicial and legislative attempt in Tennessee to fill old bottles
with new wine. The inevitable result of this approach has been some cracking of the
bottles. This cracking will no doubt continue until there has been an appropriate legis
lative revision of the law in this area.”); United States v. Silvia, 28 F.2d 73, 74 (D. Wyo.
1928) (quoting Mark 2:22: “And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new
wine doth burst the bottles, and the wine is spilled, and the bottles will be marred; but
new wine must be put into new bottles”); cf. Williams v. Emp’rs Liab. Assur. Corp., 296
F.2d 569, 580 (5th Cir. 1961) (discussing Louisiana law: “In civilian jurisdictions new
wine in old bottles is not a deceitful trick. It is inherent in the evolutive construction
that is essential to making a code live and work.”); Marshak v. Marshak, No. 088766,
1992 WL 11168, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 1992) (“[T]he pouring of new wine into
old bottles is a technique well known to the common law.”), rev’d, 628 A.2d
964 (Conn. 1993), overruled by State v. Vakilzaden, 742 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1999); Winton
D. Woods, Burnham v. Superior Court: New Wine, Old Bottles, 13 GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 199, 205 (1990) (citing De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 45 (1901)). I thank Profes
sor J. Mark Ramseyer (a self-described minister’s son) for pointing out that the saying
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reduces the learning curves for lawyers and the cognitive burden for
courts. Analogy, extrapolation, and comparison remain fundamen
tal tenets of legal reasoning; the common law grew by analogy in
part because lawyers are accustomed to using customary conceptual
tools.63 Thus, to create a new rule out of familiar parts can be to
increase the tool’s utility to its users.
Certainly the structure of the Wilkes rule is user-friendly, even
though the rule itself is quite complex. The burden-shifting ap
proach both creates and makes manageable much of that complex
ity, while creating a rule that allows for nuanced analysis. Wilkes
was decided only two years after the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which es
tablished a burden-shifting analysis for Title VII disparate impact
claims64 and quickly became one of the most important burdenmakes better sense when the words refer to putting old wine into new wineskins. See,
e.g., The Gospel of Thomas 47 (Thomas O. Lambdin trans., Forgotten Books 2007),
available at http://www.gnosis.org/naghamm/gthlamb.html (stating that “new wine is not
put into old wineskins, lest they burst”); Luke 5:37 (Revised Standard Version) (“And
no one puts new wine into old wineskins; if he does, the new wine will burst the skins
and it will be spilled, and the skins will be destroyed”). But see Luke 5:36-39 (King
James) (“And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst
the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.”).
63. See Marshak, 1992 WL 11168, at *9; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic
Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1552
(2010) (“In the common law, . . . [c]ourts extrapolate rules and principles from their
prior decisions, applying them to the specific dispute at hand. In the process, the court
fashions a new rule or exception by drawing from disparate areas of tort, contract, resti
tution, and property law—relying entirely on logic and experience.”); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 45 (1998) (“There is nothing inherently surprising about a
judicial turn to analogy as a tool for making sense of a novel form of evidence. Ana
logic reasoning is a legal mainstay, or as Cass Sunstein put it, legal culture’s ‘most char
acteristic way of proceeding.’ Judges’ particular expertise is in reasoning through
comparison; this process is at the very heart of the common law. When confronting a
novel form of evidence, then, why not compare the new to the known?” (footnotes
omitted)); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1179, 1188 (1999) (“[T]he practice of analogical reasoning from past decisions has
procedural benefits that go beyond the rational force it carries in any particular case. It
produces a habit, a method, that will lead judges to do the intellectual work of study
and comparison.”); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of The
American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 68 (1983) (stating that “[t]he ‘context
public figure’ concept is an attempt to extrapolate from the traditional common law
privileges”).
64. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 792. As the District Court for the
District of Connecticut recently summarized:
The Supreme Court has established a three-part, burden-shifting test for eval
uating the evidence in an employment discrimination case. First, the plaintiff
bears a “minimal” burden of establishing a prima facie discrimination case.
The plaintiff can generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating: (1)
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shifting case in U.S. law.65 Wilkes does not cite McDonnell Doug
las, but the parallel is inescapable.
Of course, the parallelism does not extend to what must be
shown at each stage of the analysis, because the elements of the
legal rules are quite different. Moreover, the burdens are not the
same. For example, step one of the Wilkes test requires the major
ity shareholder to prove a legitimate business purpose,66 while
under the second step of McDonnell Douglas “[t]he defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises
a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
plaintiff.”67 Nonetheless, the structural similarity makes Wilkes
easy for neophytes to grasp—“ah, a multistep burden shifting test,
just like McDonnell Douglas.”
Substantively, the Wilkes test feels familiar as a variation on
the business judgment rule. Although jurisdictions differ on how
they state and apply that venerable rule, essentially the rule: (i)
obliges those with ultimate management authority to comply with
the duties of loyalty and care;68 (ii) recognizes that the duty of care
membership in the protected group; (2) satisfactory performance in the posi
tion; (3) termination; and (4) replacement, or attempted replacement, of the
plaintiff with an employee whose qualifications do not exceed those of the
plaintiff. Second, the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the presump
tion of discrimination by proffering a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for the adverse employment action. Third, once the aforementioned presump
tion has been rebutted, the plaintiff must prove that the employer’s proffered
reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Hyde v. Beverly Hills Suites, LLC, 265 F.R.D. 61, 63 (D. Conn. 2010) (citations
omitted).
65. See, e.g., Fox v. Giaccia, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (referring to “the
familiar burden-shifting test articulated in the seminal case of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green”). In the first eighteen months following its announcement by the
Court, McDonnell Douglas was cited in at least 114 cases on the issue of burden shift
ing. ALLCASES: MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN, www.westlaw.com (search
for (mcdonnell douglas corp. /s green) & (burden /s shift!) & date(before 1976) %
ti(mcdonnell)) (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
66. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
67. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (citation
omitted). For those with an ear to constitutional jurisprudence, step three of Wilkes
might sound as if cribbed from constitutional jurisprudence involving fundamental in
terests. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973)
(“[W]here state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or
liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative.”). The Wilkes
burden is considerably milder, however.
68. 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 36-37 (rev. perm. ed. 2002).
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has both a process aspect and a substantive (or outcome) aspect,
but in ordinary circumstances accords minimal importance to the
outcome aspect;69 and (iii) presumes that those with management
authority have met their duties, thereby placing the burden of proof
on plaintiffs.70
For extraordinary circumstances, courts have tweaked or
twisted this basic formulation. For example, both Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co. 71 and Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 72 make seri
ous use of the substantive aspect of the duty of care. Under Uno
cal, “outcome” due care appears as the requirement that “a
defensive measure . . . be reasonable in relation to the threat
posed.”73 Zapata (in)famously subjects a special litigation commit
tee’s good faith and reasonable investigation to a substantive re
view under the rubric of the court’s “own independent business
judgment” in situations where pre-suit demand is excused as fu
tile.74 Extraordinary circumstances also affect the burden of proof.
For example, if a plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption of
loyalty, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove “entire
fairness.”75
Wilkes recognizes that the close corporation is itself an ex
traordinary circumstance and revises the business judgment in two
69. Thus it is almost impossible to find an ordinary duty of care case in which the
directors used acceptable process but were found wanting for having nonetheless
achieved an unreasonably bad outcome. “When applying the duty of care, courts focus
their inquiry on management’s efforts in arriving at the decision rather than on the
wisdom of the decision itself.” 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036, at 39-40.
70. Id. § 1036, at 36, 39.
71. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
72. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
73. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955.
74. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789. Although Zapata characterizes this “second
step” as “the essential key in striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims
as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation’s best interests as ex
pressed by an independent investigating committee,” subsequent case law backs off
from the two-step in several ways. Id.; e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774-75
(Del. 1990) (holding that derivative plaintiffs who make a demand admit that demand is
not futile); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985) (holding that, even when
demand has been excused as futile, the trial court is not obligated to engage in the
second step under Zapata); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813-15 (Del. 1984) (setting
high barriers to a demand futility claim and thereby restricting the circumstances in
which Zapata applies).
75. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (citation omit
ted); accord Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 180 (Mass.
1997).
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important ways. First, the defendants’ loyalty is not presumed.76
They must demonstrate a legitimate business purpose.77 Second,
Wilkes gives meaning to the outcome aspect of the duty of care.78
Although the plaintiff has the burden of proof, the court will at
least consider whether the defendants might have achieved their
goals through different methods.79
V.

APPRECIATING

THE

POWER

OF

WILKES

Wilkes is most important when both sides can justifiably point
fingers at each other. Most oppression cases involve a claimed ex
pectation of continued employment,80 and when the majority ac
cuses the terminated shareholder-employee of misconduct, the
ordinary analytic tools work poorly. Many cases use the “reasona
ble expectations” approach, asking whether the terminated em
76. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 367 (Mont. 1990)
(applying Wilkes and stating “[t]his Court is not in a position to make a corporation’s
business decision when the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business
purpose for its decision and the minority shareholder cannot demonstrate the practica
bility of a less harmful alternative”). Note that sometimes the outcome of a decision
making process can be a decision to implement a process. E.g., Lyondell Chemical Co.
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) (discussing the so-called Revlon duties applicable
when a Delaware corporation is “up for sale” and holding that the board must consider
an acceptable process but not necessarily follow the particular process laid out in Rev
lon, Inc. v. MacAndres & Forbes Holdings, Inc.). For example, a close corporation with
a shareholder-employee who has a drinking problem might deliberate on what to do
and then require the employee to comply with a process of alcohol education and treat
ment as a condition to retaining his or her job. Heiser v. Heiser & Jesko, No. 2004-L
006, 2005 WL 2211130, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2005) (quoting a letter that pro
vided: “‘As a direct result of your unacceptable actions, behavior and conduct we will
proceed with the terms of expulsion pursuant to the provisions of the Close Corpora
tion Agreement dated December 5, 1997 unless you agree to enter an accredited “Sub
stance Abuse Program” that is agreeable to a majority of the shareholders and that you
thereafter conform in all respects to the program’s requisites’”). In the terminology
used in the text, requiring that process of education and treatment would be an out
come—subject to the outcome aspect of the duty of care.
80. Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Ven
ture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corpora
tions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46 n.141 (1982) (“Many would argue that the denial of
employment [to a shareholder] is a classic example of oppression.”); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspec
tive, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 755 (2000) (“[N]umerous litigated cases involve sharehold
ers challenging their terminations as oppressive . . . .”).
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ployee reasonably expected continuing employment.81 While this
approach has been effective in determining circumstances in which
a well-behaving, well-performing co-owner might reasonably expect
a job,82 the approach does little to handle situations in which the co
owner has performed poorly. In such circumstances, a court has a
Hobson’s Choice.83 Finding a reasonable expectation of continued
employment despite the misconduct subjects the company to liabil
ity for lost wages, plus either compelled dividends or a buyout.84 To
find that the misconduct undercuts any reasonable expectation of
employment is to sentence the miscreant to a frozen-in investment.
Two cases will illustrate the problem. In 2005, the Maryland
Court of Appeals determined that a forced buyout might be neces
sary even where the minority’s misconduct was egregious.85
Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne involved a corporation that
owned and operated an assisted living facility.86 The corporation
had two shareholders: Edenbaum, the majority shareholder (51%)
and Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, the minority shareholder (49%) re
ferred to in the opinion as Schwarcz.87 At the outset, both share
holders worked in the business, and both received a salary.88
Eventually, however, Edenbaum determined that Schwarcz was be
81. E.g., Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 190
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[T]he threshold question in the context of a claim of share
holder oppression based on the termination of employment is whether a minority
shareholder’s expectation of continuing employment is reasonable.”); In re Topper, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that the “reasonable expectations [of contin
ued participation in company operations] constitute the bargain of the parties in light of
which subsequent conduct must be appraised”); Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432,
443 (N.D. 2008) (holding that “[t]he threshold issue” when reviewing a claim of share
holder oppression arising from termination of employment “is whether the minority
shareholder had a reasonable expectation of continued employment” (citation omitted)
(quotation marks omitted)).
82. E.g., Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 817 (Mass. 2009) (finding that mi
nority shareholder who was innocent of wrong-doing had a reasonable expectation of
continued employment as president of the company, and that expectation was frus
trated when majority owners secretly hired his replacement and fired him as president);
Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that minority
shareholder had a reasonable expectation of lifetime employment that was violated af
ter he was fired by his brothers for investigating accounting discrepancies).
83. Hobson’s Choice, THE PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/
hobsons-choice.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2010) (A Hobson’s choice is “[n]o real choice
at all—the only options being to either accept or refuse the offer that is given to you”).
84. See, e.g., Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 380-81 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
85. Id. at 381.
86. Id. at 367.
87. Id. at 368.
88. Id. at 368-69.
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having improperly toward the business in general and vulnerable
patients in particular.89 After seeking unsuccessfully either to sell
his stock to Schwarcz or buy her out, Edenbaum terminated
Schwarcz’s employment and caused the corporation to stop paying
her salary.90 The company had no profits and thus no dividends
were paid.91
Schwarcz sued, claiming oppression and seeking dissolution.92
At trial, Edenbaum provided substantial testimony of Schwarcz’s
misconduct, including her failing to provide receipts for petty cash
and grocery shopping, buying gourmet and Hungarian food for her
self with company money, “transcribing medications from doctors’
orders” even though she did not know how; and breaching patient
confidentiality by faxing incident reports to her daughter for trans
lation.93 In addition, witnesses stated that Schwarcz “had been
‘rough’ with a patient . . . had ‘pick[ed]’ [a] patient ‘up by the dia
per’ and had called another patient ‘ugly.’”94
According to Edenbaum, Schwarcz also had a poor relation
ship with the staff.95 He stated that she “frighten[ed] and ‘de
mean[ed]’ them” and “treated them as slaves.”96 In addition, she
allowed her violent son to live at the facility.97 The son had alleg
edly scared the patients and threatened Edenbaum’s life.98
The circuit court held that “Edenbaum had the right, granted
him by the shareholders’ agreement, to discharge Schwarcz from
her position with the company”99 and reversed a trial court ruling
that awarded Schwarcz back pay.100 However, the Court of Special
Appeals held that terminating Schwarcz constituted oppression:
The “reasonable expectations” view of oppressive conduct
“[r]ecogniz[es] that a minority shareholder who reasonably ex
pects that ownership in the corporation would entitle him to a
job, a share of the corporate earnings, and a place in corporate
89.
90.
91.
92.
at 371.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 370.
at 369.
at 370-71.
at 369. She made other claims as well, but they are not relevant here. Id.

Id. at 370.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
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management would be ‘oppressed’ in a very real sense [sic] when
the majority seeks to defeat those expectations and there exists
no effective means of salvaging the investment.”101

At the inception of her relationship with Edenbaum, Schwarcz
signed an agreement (the same one that authorized her
dismissal).102
[The agreement] provided that she would be employed as its Di
rector of Operations with specified duties and at a salary equal to
Edenbaum’s. Moreover, as an officer and director of Liberty,
she expected to continue to participate in shareholders’ meetings
and receive company reports. All that apparently ended when
she was terminated from her position as Director of Operations.
Her termination substantially defeated her reasonable expecta
tions that she would be employed by the corporation, receive a
salary, and take part in its management.103

Even though “the circuit court did not find Edenbaum acted in
bad faith,”104 Edenbaum had committed actionable oppression.105
The relevant statute specified dissolution as the remedy, but the
Maryland court joined courts of other states in interpreting the stat
utory language to permit less draconian remedies.106 Relying on a
West Virginia case for a lengthy list of alternatives, the court of
appeals remanded the case for a determination as to whether some
outcome short of dissolution might remedy the harm inflicted on
Schwarcz.107
The list included both forced dividends and a forced buyout,108
but neither of those remedies would have been fair to Edenbaum or
to the corporation.109 The corporation had essentially no profits,110
and Schwarcz’s conduct had probably damaged the business.111
Should the corporation have been required to borrow money in or
der to pay dividends to a shareholder whose misconduct disquali
fied her from employment?
101. Id. at 379 (quoting Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987)).
102. Id. at 368.
103. Id. at 379.
104. Id. at 381.
105. Id. at 379-80.
106. Id. at 380.
107. Id. at 380-81 (citing Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 n.12
(W.Va. 1980)).
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 370.
111. Id.
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A forced buyout would have been even worse, requiring the
corporation (or its remaining owner) to go into debt in order to
make liquid the miscreant’s ownership interest. In essence, the
court would be creating a “put” right for the miscreant.112
A Minnesota case provides another example of this “miscreant
put right.” Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc. involved an “un
fair prejudice” claim by a shareholder employee whose employ
ment had been terminated.113 The corporation had three
shareholders, each named Pooley, and each owned one-third of the
stock.114 “The trial court . . . did conclude that respondents [two of
the three shareholders], as directors of Mankato’s board, unfairly
prejudiced appellant by freezing him out of a business in which he
reasonably expected to participate.”115
However, the appellant was hardly a model employee:
In the early 1980’s, appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting some
one in the scope of his employment. In 1989, appellant assaulted
respondent Gregory Pooley. He also damaged a customer’s
truck. As a result, a jury convicted appellant of assault and crimi
nal damage to property. Following this conviction, Mankato ter
minated appellant’s employment.116

Nonetheless, the trial court ordered a buyout,117 and the court
of appeals left that order in place.118 The result: (i) a shareholder
employee repeatedly engages in criminal conduct on the job,119
doubtlessly disrupting and probably damaging the business; (ii) the
other shareholders, seeking to protect the business, terminate the
112. A “put” is “[a]n option to sell something (esp. securities) at a fixed price
even if the market delines; the right to require another to buy.” BLACK’S LAW DIC
TIONARY 1204 (9th ed. 2009). Here, the analogy to such “put” is created when a court
creates a right held by the minority shareholder to require that majority shareholders
buyout the interest of the minority shareholder in a forced buyout.
113. Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994). Under Minnesota law, “unfair prejudice” rather than “oppression” is the term of
art. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subdiv. 1(b)(3) (2010). Another subdivision infuses “rea
sonable expectations” into the concept of unfair prejudice. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751,
subdiv. 3a.
114. Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 836.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 838. In fairness to the court of appeals, I note that its hands were tied.
The respondents did not appeal the ruling on unfair prejudice, seeking instead to get a
discount on the buyout price due to appellant’s misconduct. Id. at 836. The court of
appeals rejected the discount argument and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 838.
119. Id. at 836.
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miscreant’s employment;120 and (iii) the court turns the sequence
into a “fist in your face” put right.
Now re-consider each of these cases under the Wilkes rule.
The question ceases to be the “all or nothing” one of oppression vel
non. Instead, the plaintiffs assert their expectations of continued
employment (step zero), triggering the majority’s burden of proving
a legitimate business purpose (step one).121 In each of the two
cases, proof was abundantly available to pass these first two
steps.122 The burden would then shift to the plaintiff to show a less
harmful alternative. Each plaintiff would be hard pressed to do so.
Each corporation acted to protect its business;123 it seems impru
dent to continue the employment of someone who abuses vulnera
ble patients or commits criminal damage to customer’s property.
Perhaps plaintiff Schwarz could have argued that her conduct did
not disqualify her from continuing to serve as a director of the cor
poration, and plaintiff Pooley could have argued that the corpora
tion should have sent him to anger management classes. Even
assuming success with these arguments, the remedy would have
been far less intrusive and unfair than creating a put right for the
miscreant.124
Also under Wilkes’s step two, either plaintiff could have ar
gued for paying dividends in lieu of salary, but each would have had
the burden of proving such dividends practicable. The testimony in
Edenbaum v. Osztreicherne indicated that the corporation lacked
the resources to declare dividends.125 Pooley does not discuss the
issue, because once the trial court ordered a forced buyout, finan
cial practicality was irrelevant.
Wilkes is not alone in attempting to counterpoise the rights of
an evident miscreant and an allegedly overreacting majority. For
example, Gimpel v. Bolstein dealt with the alleged oppression of a
120. Id.
121. See supra Part III.
122. See Edenbaum v. Schwarcz-Osztreicherne, 885 A.2d 365, 370 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2005); Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 836. The analysis here assumes genuine claims of
misconduct against the disgruntled shareholder. For a case in which a court found mis
conduct claims to be trumped up, see Cooke v. Fresh Express Foods Corp., 7 P.3d 717,
723-24 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
123. See Edenbaum, 885 A.2d at 370; Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 836.
124. Serving as a director would not have brought Schwarz any return on her
investment but might have allowed her to discern when (if ever) the corporation had
the wherewithal to distribute profits. Even then, however, the decision whether to
make a distribution would lie within the business judgment of the majority. Zidell v.
Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977).
125. Edenbaum, 885 A.2d at 370.
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shareholder, Robert, who “was, in fact, a thief, [who] . . . stole from
the family company, and was discharged from all company employ
ment when his theft became known.”126 The ostracism was essen
tially total:
Since [the firing], Robert has received no benefits from his
ownership position with this obviously profitable company. The
company has continued to adhere to its policy of not paying divi
dends and, while the other shareholders have received substan
tial sums as salary, benefits and perquisites, Robert has received
not a penny. Not surprisingly, he has also been excluded from all
managerial decisions (there have been no formal shareholders’
meetings) and has received the barest minimum of information
concerning company affairs.127

At one point in his opinion, the judge seems almost ready to
take an “all or nothing” view of Robert’s lot:
[I]t must be recognized that “reasonable expectations” do not
run only one way. To the extent that Robert may have enter
tained “reasonable expectations” of profit in 1975, the other
shareholders also entertained “reasonable expectations” of fidel
ity and honesty from him. All such expectations were shattered
when Robert stole from the corporation. His own acts broke all
bargains. Since then, the only expectations he could reasonably
entertain were those of a discovered thief: ostracism and prosecu
tion. To the extent that the majority has refrained from prosecut
ing him, they have dealt with him more kindly than he had
reason to expect, not less.128

In the very next paragraph, however, the judge puts a limit to
the permissible ostracism: “[e]ven though Robert may not lay claim
to the reasonable expectation of any specific benefits, it does not
necessarily follow that the majority shareholders may treat him as
shabbily as they please.”129 Shifting from “reasonable expecta
tions” to the question of “whether [the majority’s] conduct was in
herently oppressive,” the court holds that “[a]lthough a minority
shareholder may be in the position of a stranger to them, the major
ity must still act with ‘probity and fair dealing,’ and if their conduct

126.
127.
128.
129.

Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1019-20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1020.
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becomes ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful,’ they may be found to
have been guilty of oppression.”130
Invoking a most venerable authority, the court then gets down
to the nitty-gritty:
Robert cannot be forever compelled to remain an outcast. Even
Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengefulness of
his fellow man. (Genesis 4:12-15.) While his past misdeeds pro
vided sufficient justification for the majority’s acts to date, there
is a limit to what he can be forced to bear, and that limit has been
reached. The other shareholders need not allow him to return to
employment with the corporation, but they must by some means
allow him to share in the profits.131

In sum, although the court details a lengthy list of possible
remedies, the bottom line is simple: “the majority must make an
election: they must either alter the corporate financial structure so
as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable
offer to buy out Robert’s interest.”132
Given the profitability of the corporation involved in Gimpel,
the court’s order might well have been proper—despite “a no-divi
dend policy” that already “was firmly established when the present
majority came into control of the corporation.”133 Gimpel falls
short of Wilkes, however, on the question of burden shifting.
Gimpel obliges the majority to fashion a concession to the thief.
The genius of Wilkes, in contrast, is to place on the miscreant the
burden of fashioning a practical, non-simplistic solution to the
problems created by the mischief.
CONCLUSION
Wilkes is alive and well in Massachusetts,134 and has influenced
the law in several other states as well. For example, Montana spe
cifically adopted Wilkes in 1990:
130. Id. (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 393
(Or. 1973)).
131. Id. at 1021.
132. Id. at 1022.
133. Id. at 1020.
134. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816-17 (Mass. 2009) (applying Wilkes
and upholding the trial court’s determination “that Pointer’s actions did not require his
termination because less harmful alternatives outweighed ‘any of the asserted business
purposes for the actions that Castellani and Woodberry [the controlling shareholders]
took in secretly engaging Maurer [Pointer’s replacement]’” (quoting trial court)).
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We determine that the reasoning of the Massachusetts court
is persuasive and also hold that the fiduciary duty between stock
holders of a close corporation is one of the “utmost good faith
and loyalty.” However, the controlling group should not be
stymied by a minority stockholder’s grievances if the controlling
group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose and the mi
nority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful
alternative.135

In 2000, the Minnesota Court of Appeals discussed Wilkes in
approving tones, but the discussion was dicta.136 The court deter
mined as a matter of law that the defendants had not infringed any
protected interest of the plaintiff.137 The next year, however, an
other Minnesota court explained that “[e]xpectations of continuing
employment must also be balanced against the controlling share
holder’s need for flexibility to run the business in a productive man
ner,” citing Wilkes’s “concern [in] the ‘untempered application of
the strict good-faith standard.’”138
A 2001 New Mexico decision seemed likewise to embrace
Wilkes. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C. praised Wilkes as having
a “common sense approach [that] alleviated the court’s concern
that ‘untempered application of the strict good faith standard’ could
unduly hamper corporate management. This approach provides
equilibrium to the majority’s need to pursue legitimate business ac
tions and the minority’s vulnerability to oppression in a close corpo
ration.”139 Walta, however, did not apply Wilkes’ multistep

135. Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990).
136. Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
137. Id. at 375 (“As a matter of law West did not breach a fiduciary duty, unfairly
prejudice Berreman within the meaning of [the statute], or commit fraud.”); see also
Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (invoking
the legitimate business purpose prong of Wilkes but ignoring steps two and three).
138. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657, 663 (1976)). It is not clear, however, whether Gunderson adopts the Wilkes test.
The opinion can be read instead as adopting an all-or-nothing rule for miscreants that
tends to favor the majority. “[A]n expectation of continuing employment is not reason
able and oppression liability does not arise when the shareholder-employee’s own mis
conduct or incompetence causes the termination of employment.” Id. at 192.
Nonetheless, the decision appears to leave open through remand the possibility of Gun
derson pursuing damages in his capacity as a shareholder-employee. See id. at 193.
139. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663).
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analysis, because the defendant could not establish a legitimate bus
iness purpose for his behavior.140
Meanwhile, the spirit of Wilkes has pushed Massachusetts law
even further away from the “miscreant put right.” In 2006, Brodie
v. Jordan essentially eliminated the forced buyout as a remedy in
oppression cases, even when the complainant is blameless.141 Not
ing that Massachusetts statutes do not provide for dissolution as an
oppression remedy and therefore do not implicitly authorize the
lesser remedy of a buyout,142 Brodie holds that “[t]he remedy [for
oppression] should neither grant the minority a windfall nor exces
sively penalize the majority. Rather, it should attempt to reset the
proper balance between the majority’s ‘concede[d] . . . rights to
what has been termed selfish ownership,’ and the minority’s reason
able expectations of benefit from its shares.”143
Brodie rejects the buyout remedy because that remedy in
volves a put right that is at odds with the very nature of a close
corporation:
In ordering the defendants to purchase the plaintiff’s stock
at the price of her share of the company, the judge created an
artificial market for the plaintiff’s minority share of a close cor
poration—an asset that, by definition, has little or no market
140. Id. at 460. Several states have also cited Wilkes to help support the notion
that the majority has legitimate rights of selfish ownership. G&N Aircraft, Inc. v.
Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 240 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Wilkes to show that “there must be a
balance struck between the majority’s fiduciary obligations and its rights,” but holding
that majority shareholder’s actions in strong-arming out minority shareholder went be
yond his rights and caused a breach of fiduciary duty); Connolly v. Bain, 484 N.W.2d
207, 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citing Wilkes to show that majority shareholders have
the right to make management decisions, including the selection, retention, and dismis
sal of officers and employees); Kortum v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 432, 446 (N.D. 2008)
(quoting Wilkes when determining that minority shareholder’s expectation of continued
employment must be balanced against majority’s “need for flexibility to run the busi
ness in a productive manner”); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Or. 1977)
(citing Wilkes for the proposition that the majority owners have a right to make busi
ness decisions which favor their own interests as long as the decisions are not made in
bad faith when the majority refused to declare additional dividends demanded by mi
nority owner who voluntarily left his position); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 649
(Tenn. 1997) (quoting Wilkes to show “that the controlling group in a close corporation
must have some room to maneuver” after majority forced out minority owner who they
felt had not been serving customers appropriately); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d
146, 157 (Utah 2009) (quoting Wilkes for “the importance of balancing a shareholders’
expectations with the reasonable and legitimate business interests of the other
shareholders”).
141. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006).
142. Id. at 1082 n.7.
143. Id. at 1080 (internal citation omitted).
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value. Thus, the remedy had the perverse effect of placing the
plaintiff in a position superior to that which she would have en
joyed had there been no wrongdoing.
The remedy of a forced buyout may be an appealing one for
a court of equity in that it results in a “clean break” between
acrimonious parties. Yet this rationale would require a forced
share purchase in virtually every freeze-out case, given that re
sort to litigation is itself an indication of the inability of share
holders to work together. In any event, no matter how expedient
a forced buyout may be as a solution, the remedy for a breach of
fiduciary duty must be proportional to the breach. Other reme
dies are available to compensate and protect minority sharehold
ers without radically transforming the nature of their asset or
arbitrarily increasing its value.144

Whether Brodie goes too far in restricting oppression remedies
is a question for another Symposium, or at least another article.
For the purposes of this symposium, it should now be clear that
Wilkes has a commendable legacy. By recognizing the legitimate
rights of selfish ownership and disfavoring all-or-nothing ap
proaches to oppression analysis, Wilkes has made significant con
ceptual and practical contributions to the law of closely held
businesses.

144.

Id. at 1081-82 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted).

